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RESPONSE
SYMPATHY FOR THE DEVIL:
GAWKER, THIEL, AND NEWSWORTHINESS
AMY GAJDA*
At a time when some courts had shifted to protect privacy rights more than
press rights, the Gawker website published a grainy and apparently
surreptitiously recorded sex tape featuring professional wrestler Hulk Hogan.
What the jury that awarded Hulk Hogan more than $140 million in his privacy
lawsuit did not know is that Peter Thiel, an individual apparently motivated
to bring Gawker down, had helped to bankroll the plaintiff’s case. This
Response, inspired by The Weaponized Lawsuit Against the Media:
Litigation Funding as a New Threat to Journalism, argues that both sides
in the Gawker dispute deserve some level of sympathy. First, Gawker for rejecting
at times too restrictive ethics considerations when those considerations can lead
to non-reporting that protects the powerful. But it also argues that sympathy is
due to Thiel whose parallel motivation was to protect individual privacy at a
time when some publishers believed they could publish whatever they wished. It
ultimately concludes that caps on damages might best balance important and
competing interests between press and privacy.
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Pleased to meet you
Hope you guess my name
But what’s puzzling you
Is the nature of my game.
—Rolling Stones, Sympathy for the Devil1
INTRODUCTION
There is a great quote from Politico media critic Jack Shafer in Lili
Levi’s important Article, The Weaponized Lawsuit Against the Media:
Litigation Funding as a New Threat to Journalism.2 “By secretly investing
in the Hogan lawsuit,” Shafer wrote, “Thiel has done the impossible:
He’s made us sympathize with Gawker.”3
That collective “us” reflects multiple conversations that I have had
with journalists and their allies who care deeply about press rights.
Many sympathize with Gawker, a website known for its at times pushthe-envelope but truthful reporting, and see Peter Thiel, a billionaire
venture capitalist, as the enemy because he helped to bring down one
of their own. Thiel indeed funded at least in part the Hulk Hogan
invasion-of-privacy lawsuit that ultimately bankrupted Gawker.4
As Levi explained in her piece, however, Gawker and its news
judgment had already become notorious by the time of the Hulk
Hogan sex tape publication, including its 2007 story headlined “Peter
Thiel is totally gay, people,” at a time when Thiel considered that

1. The Rolling Stones, Sympathy for the Devil (Decca Records 1968).
2. Lili Levi, The Weaponized Lawsuit Against the Media: Litigation Funding as a New
Threat to Journalism, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 761, 777–78 (2017).
3. Id. (citing Jack Shafer, Peter Thiel Does the Impossible! Nobody’s Ever Sympathized
with Gawker Before, POLITICO (May 25, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/
story/2016/05/gawker-peter-thiel-fourth-estate-213918)).
4. Levi, supra note 2, at 764 n.4, 773–75; see also Matt Drange, Peter Thiel’s War on
Gawker:
A Timeline, FORBES (June 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
mattdrange/2016/06/21/peter-thiels-war-on-gawker-a-timeline
(providing
a
background of Peter Thiel’s career and a timeline of his attack on Gawker).
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information part of his private life.5 Part of its questionable reputation
stemmed from Gawker Media founder and editor Nick Denton’s nearmission statement that Gawker would publish the sort of information
that ethics-abiding news publications would not6 and the even more
strident suggestion that Gawker would publish any information, as
long as it was true and interesting.7 Such a propriety-defying
publication history, especially the flaunting of journalistic ethics,
makes Gawker decidedly devilish. There is, however, good reason to
have sympathy for the sort of devil that sets out to report the truth
known to only a select, and often times, powerful few. One wonders,
for example, if Gawker’s journalistic audacity had been more
commonplace, whether Hollywood mogul Harvey Weinstein, Alabama
politician Roy Moore, and multiple others in power would have been
able to mistreat as many as they allegedly did. Truthful reporting helps
bring to light important secrets in Hollywood, in Congress, and in
other high places—secrets often known to journalists who are silenced
more by ethics considerations than legal ones. All that makes Gawker
as an entity rather sympathetic.
And yet, journalism’s ethical limits are there in large part to protect
individuals’ rights to privacy. Gawker’s carefree attitude toward the
very real emotional harm that can be done to people when their
privacy is invaded is what ultimately brought it down.
This means that if one values individual privacy at all, it is possible to
have sympathy for another devil of sorts, and that is Peter Thiel
himself.8 Thiel held a grudge and brought down a website that many
relied upon for information, but, in doing so, helped protect
individual privacy at a time when many online publishers believed that
they could indeed publish whatever they wanted as long as it was true.
5. Id. at 770 (examining Gawker’s notoriety on the internet even prior to the
Hulk Hogan sex tape).
6. Jeff Bercovici, Playboy Interview: Nick Denton, PLAYBOY (Feb. 24, 2014, 8:30 AM),
http://www.playboy.com/articles/gawker-playboy-interview-nick-denton. This would
include, Denton suggested, “sex pictures” because such images would be beneficial for
society by having the effect of changing institutions, rather than damaging the
individual. Id.
7. See Erik Wemple, Condé Nast Exec Story: Gawker is Keeping Its Sleaze Game in Shape,
WASH. POST (July 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/
wp/2015/07/17/conde-nast-exec-story-gawker-is-keeping-its-sleaze-game-in-shape
(detailing the actions of Gawker in a scandal after the Hogan lawsuit).
8. Thiel might be considered devilish in another way. He was an early investor in
Facebook, a company known for disrupting both traditional media and traditional
notions of privacy.
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This Response9 proceeds in two main parts. In Part I, it explores
three lawsuits whose troubling legal legacy stemmed, at least in part,
from Gawker’s news judgment hubris at a time when the courts’
patience for the media was thinning.10 Part II describes how an
emerging judicial shift favoring privacy over press rights led in part to
Gawker’s downfall.
Finally, Part III suggests that sympathy for Gawker is appropriate as
long as that sympathy is tempered by frank understanding of the very
real costs its devil-may-care brashness posed not only for its subjects,
but for a free press itself.
I. GAWKER AND ITS CHOICES
I have argued before that Gawker is not typical mainstream
journalism.11 I labeled it quasi-journalism, an umbrella term that
includes publications that publish truth while, at times, flaunting
mainstream journalism’s ethical considerations.12
The quasijournalism category differentiates Gawker’s questionable publication
choices from those of more ethics-based traditional journalism outlets
such as the New York Times.
The differentiation is important in journalism.
Ethics
considerations play a key role in news judgment; reporters struggle
daily with how much, if any, embarrassing information to include in
any particular story. Journalists must be concerned not only with the
truthfulness and relevance of the information they publish, but also
with whether the harms that might come to individuals from disclosure
outweigh the public’s interest in the matter. The Society of
Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics, for example, suggests that

9. Essay would be a better word, given that this piece was inspired by Professor Levi’s
Article and is not meant to be a direct response to her arguments. In fact, several of the
points made here do not contradict but amplify some of the points made by Professor Levi.
10. See Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial
Regulation of the Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1041–43, 1067–68, 1071–72, 1077–78
(2009) (arguing that “declining respect for journalism and growing anxiety over the
loss of privacy” shifted judicial deference in defining “newsworthiness” from journalists
themselves to, at times, the standards suggested by their code of professional ethics).
11. See, AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI
THREATEN A FREE PRESS 122–23 (2015) (arguing that Gawker, unlike traditional
journalism, published sensational news items more likely to inflict emotional harm,
and that it refused to follow an established mainstream ethics code).
12. Id.
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journalists minimize the harm that might occur from their coverage.13
“Journalists should,” one provision reads, “[b]alance the public’s need
for information against potential harm or discomfort.”14 That same
provision reminds journalists that “[p]ursuit of the news is not a license
for arrogance or undue intrusiveness.”15 Another warns that even
though journalists may legally have access to certain information, the
publication of that information may not be ethical.16 For example, an
additional provision reads that journalists should avoid publishing
information that merely panders to the public’s lurid curiosity.17
I have argued that adherence to these ethics provisions and others
like them helps differentiate a journalist from a mere publisher of
information.18 And this differentiation implicitly undergirds the legal
precedents that have given journalists wide latitude. As the law
currently stands, “newsworthiness” is the boundary line that separates
legally protected privacy interests from constitutionally protected press
rights.19 For the most part, courts have been inclined to defer to
journalists in deciding what is newsworthy, effectively presuming that
anything published by reputable media has value as news. But that
deference dates back to an era in which professional journalists largely
controlled access to the printing presses and broadcast spectrum
necessary to reach a mass audience. As a result, established judicial
deference to journalists has been premised on an assumption that
journalists are doing their own responsible privacy-versus-publicinterest sort of balancing test before a news story sees the light of day.
These assumptions are now bumping up against the realities of a new
age in which everyone has access to publish and which renegade
disruptors like Gawker are challenging traditional media norms.

13. SPJ
Code
of
Ethics,
SOC’Y
OF
PROF.
JOURNALISTS,
http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (last updated Sept. 6, 2014, 4:49 PM).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id. (noting that journalists should “[a]void pandering to lurid curiosity”).
18. See GAJDA, supra note 11, at 222–24, 254–58 (arguing that to prevent erosion of
the freedom of press, journalists should separate themselves from “unethical
publishers who call for continually extending press rights to shield every conceivable
disclosure of information, no matter the source and no matter the resulting harm”).
19. The Restatement (Second) of Torts points out that there is no invasion of
privacy when journalists publish on matters of legitimate public concern.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 352D cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977). This includes
matters that are “customarily regarded as news.” Id. cmt. g.
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In other words, despite Gawker’s focus on truth over ethics, there is
no blanket protection in the law for the revelation of all pieces of
truthful information simply because they are truthful. The legal
analysis at issue when a lawsuit involves privacy-invading truth is far
more nuanced and has been so since at least 1890 when Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote their famous law review article, The
Right to Privacy, arguing that we all have a right to privacy that should
protect us from unfettered media choices.20
The Second Restatement of Torts, published nearly ninety years
later, also helped to introduce the question of newsworthiness into this
balance between individual privacy rights and freedom of the press.21
The Restatement protects publishers who publish truthful information
but only to a point. It suggests that liability is appropriate for media
that publishes truthful information that can be characterized as “morbid
and sensational prying . . . for its own sake,”22 information that would
be of no interest to a member of the public with decent standards.23
Despite the respect being accorded individual privacy, courts have
protected journalists’ news choices, even when those decisions were at
the margins of propriety.24 In addition to constitutional concerns,
courts would explain that they knew little of journalism and, therefore,
hesitated to second guess the news judgments made by professional
journalists.25 Such hesitation of the courts meant that for years
journalists routinely won invasion-of-privacy lawsuits brought by
plaintiffs whose private information had been published.26

20. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195–96 (1891) (discussing the foundations and development of privacy law).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D.
22. Id. cmt. h.
23. Id. cmts. g–h (identifying the Restatement section that includes what is
“customarily regarded as news,” and explaining the scope of a private fact).
24. See, e.g., Anderson v. Blake, No. CIV-05-0729-HE, 2006 WL 314447, at *2
(W.D. Okla. Feb. 9, 2006) (deciding as a matter of law that the media’s right to
disseminate newsworthy information outweighed an individual’s right to privacy,
where the newsworthy information was a video of the plaintiff being raped), aff'd sub
nom. Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2007).
25. See, e.g., id. at *2 (citing Ross v. Midwest Commc’ns, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 275 (5th
Cir. 1989)) (stating that judicial judgments on journalists’ decisions could have a
“chilling effect on the freedom of the press to determine what is a matter of legitimate
public concern”).
26. See Gajda, supra note 10, at 1957–61 (reviewing Supreme Court decisions and
the lower courts’ interpretation of these decisions—“[I]t often appeared that the
‘news’ was whatever reporters and editors said it was”).
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One rather extreme example of this deference to journalism is the
outcome in Anderson v. Blake.27 In Anderson, a television news program
had aired video portions of the plaintiff’s rape, a crime that had been
videotaped by her attacker.28 The court admitted that the clip showed
“brief shots of plaintiff’s naked feet and calves [and] also revealed the
alleged attacker’s face, showed portions of his naked body and
depicted him moving above and around plaintiff’s obscured body.”29
Nevertheless, the court decided that the tape’s news value trumped the
plaintiff victim’s privacy rights: “As plaintiff admits,” the court wrote,
“the circumstances surrounding her alleged rape and the alleged rapes
of two others by the same person were newsworthy” and the tape itself
helped provide evidence to viewers that the man had indeed
committed the crime and had recorded it.30
In Anderson, the court suggested that its hands were basically tied. It
could not properly protect the freedom of the press to determine what
is of legitimate public concern while simultaneously engaging in “afterthe-fact judicial ‘blue-penciling.’”31 Even if the court, in hindsight,
would have made a different editorial decision, it explained that it had
to “resist the temptation to edit journalists aggressively.”32
With the growth of the internet, however, came a decided change in
media and a shift among some judges from news judgment deference
to news judgment skepticism. As publishers began to publish information
without seeming regard to ethics-delineated boundaries and individual
privacy interests, courts began to respond by curtailing journalists’
ability to decide for themselves what is newsworthy.33 These courts also
began to embrace privacy more stridently.34 The Ohio Supreme Court,
for example, accepted the false light privacy tort for the first time in
2007.35 The court explained that “ethical standards regarding the
acceptability of certain [internet-based] discourse ha[d] been

27. No. CIV-05-0729-HE, 2006 WL 314447, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 9, 2006), aff'd
sub nom. Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2007).
28. Id.
29. Id. (footnotes omitted).
30. Id. at *2.
31. Id. (citing Ross v. Midwest Commc’ns, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1989)).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., GAJDA, supra note 11, Chapter Three (reviewing a number of state and
federal court decisions ruling against the media).
34. See, e.g., Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Ohio 2007) (adopting
§ 652(e) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
35. Id. at 1052; 57 A.L.R.4th 22 (1987).
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lowered,” leading to real harm to individuals’ reputations.36 Thus, “the
law’s ability to protect the innocent” needed bolstering.37 A year later,
a federal trial court decided that NBC could be liable for intentional
infliction of emotional distress for its “To Catch a Predator” reporting;
a prosecutor (and apparent would-be child sex offender) had killed
himself while cameras waited to record his arrest.38 The court suggested
that NBC had failed to follow journalism ethics rules, thereby creating
potential liability for its truthful, but what the court apparently
considered emotionally harmful and privacy-invading, reporting.39
It was in this decidedly shifted environment—one that was
beginning to embrace privacy ideals over the freedom of the press—
that Gawker published the Hulk Hogan sex tape.40 In doing so, Gawker
pushed the question of where to draw the press-privacy line to the
forefront in a case involving extreme and decidedly uncomfortable
facts. The case is explored more fully later in this Response.41
In July 2015, while the Hulk Hogan case was pending, Gawker
pushed another envelope of journalistic propriety when it published
text messages between the relatively unknown David Geithner, the
chief financial officer of Condé Nast who was married to a woman, and
a male escort who was also a porn star.42 The texts were deeply private
and their public revelation would be certainly embarrassing.43
Moreover, in a journalistic sense, they appeared merely voyeuristic and
had little or no news value.44 “[T]his is Gawker,” the Washington Post
critically noted, suggesting that Gawker had made a “pretty automatic
editorial decision” to “Publish!” even under decidedly questionable
conditions.45 “The rest of the world,” the New York Times reported,

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Welling, 866 N.E.2d at 1058.
Id. at 1058–59.
Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Id.
See Mary Bustillos, Everything You Need to Know About Hulk Hogan vs Gawker,
MOTHERBOARD (July 1, 2015), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/
mgbyd8/hulk-hogans-sex-tape-is-about-to-go-to-trial-gawker
(detailing
the
circumstances of the Hulk Hogan lawsuit).
41. See infra Section I.C (describing the Hulk Hogan case in depth, including the
process of publication and the public’s reaction).
42. Wemple, supra note 7.
43. Id. (reporting that David Geithner had arranged to pay a male escort $2500
for a three-hour session).
44. Id. (noting that the meeting between Geithner and the male escort ultimately
did not come to fruition, and thus, it was “[n]ot that much of a story”).
45. Id.
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“scream[ed] in condemnation” of Gawker’s publication choice.46 The
Huffington Post accused Gawker of “gay-shaming,” refusing to label the
“outing” story as journalism.47 The subhead to the Huffington Post
article read, “The people who work there should be ashamed.”48
Eventually, Nick Denton ordered the article removed from the
Gawker website.49 He explained that he had come to recognize that
the media environment had shifted from one that would defend the
article as based on truth to one that expected greater editorial
restraint.50 “We all have secrets,” he explained, and “they are not all
equally worthy of exposure.”51
But the damage had been done. Clay Calvert, a journalism professor
at the University of Florida and a staunch advocate of the press, told
The Washington Post at the time that the questionable publication
showed that Gawker had continually “push[ed] the envelope of
newsworthiness.”52 He predicted that, someday, a pro-press First
Amendment defense based upon news value alone would not be
successful in court and that Gawker would lose.53 That day would come
a few months later when a jury decided that Gawker had gone too far
in its publication of the Hulk Hogan sex tape.54
The notion of an unfettered press speaking truth to power is
sympathetic, even heroic, but there is room for doubt over whether
Gawker’s news judgments should be considered journalism, given its
gaudy rejection of conventional professional standards.55 Was Gawker
playing a game of sorts with courts when it proudly crossed the line of
appropriateness in publishing? Or was the game when it wrapped itself

46. Id.
47. See Gabriel Arana, Gawker’s Outing of Condé Nast CFO is Gay-Shaming, Not
Journalism, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/gawker-condenast-david-geithner_us_55a90c56e4b0c5f0322d0b2c (last updated July 21, 2015,
2:35 PM) (“The people who work there should be ashamed.”).
48. Id.
49. Nick Denton, Taking a Post Down, KINJA: NICK DENTON (July 17, 2015, 2:30 PM),
http://nick.kinja.com/taking-a-post-down-1718581684.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Wemple, supra note 7.
53. Id.
54. See Bollea v. Gawker, No. 12-012447CI-11, 2016 Fla. Cir. Lexis 4703, at *¶3–5
(Fla. Cir. Ct. June 8, 2016) (agreeing with the jury that the sex tape was not a matter
of legitimate public concern, and therefore Gawker’s invasion of Terry Bollea’s privacy
was not protected by the First Amendment).
55. See GAJDA, supra note 11, at 122–23.
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in First Amendment protections when it made news judgments
antithetical to traditional journalism?
Gawker’s devilish role becomes clearer given three examples of the
ways in which the judicial system responded to the website and its
envelope pushing. In each, there seems to be at least the potential for
some lasting anti-Gawker effect that could burden all media.
A. The Teenager v. Gawker
Unfortunately, in any discussion of media litigation financing, the
Gawker case stands as today’s most prominent example. Litigation
financing, especially by individuals out to get media companies, is
indeed troubling, as Professor Levi explains. Yet, as detailed above,
Gawker’s own brashly anti-ethics stance necessarily makes it far from
the perfect media darling.56
As another example, take Gawker’s 2012 decision to publish an
article titled, “Female High School Student Accused of Flashing Vagina in
Yearbook Photo,” which brought international attention to a North Carolina
high schooler.57 The article suggested that the 18-year-old had been
accused of “exposing her hooha” by “lifting her graduation gown,” and
that said image had been published in the high school yearbook, which
Gawker called a “crotchbook.”58 To illustrate its story, Gawker included
a photo of the high school student in her cap and gown, but it covered
both her face and her pelvic area with suggestive black bars.59
The teenager asked that Gawker take the story down, arguing that
editors had decidedly misconstrued her fully clothed and very
appropriate yearbook stance, but Gawker refused.60 The student’s
resulting lawsuit maintained that she had suffered severe emotional
harm after the publication of the article, explaining that even strangers
had ridiculed her.61 She brought claims against Gawker for libel and
for negligent infliction of emotional distress.62 Gawker filed a motion

56. Levi, supra note 2, at 765; see supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.
57. Neetzan Zimmerman, Female High School Student Accused of Flashing Vagina in
Yearbook Photo, GAWKER (May 25, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://gawker.com/5913350/
female-high-school-student-accused-of-flashing-fem-junk-in-yearbook-photo; see also
Araya v. Deep Dive Media, LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 582, 585 (W.D.N.C. 2013).
58. Zimmerman, supra note 57.
59. Id.
60. Araya, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 586.
61. Id. at 586–87.
62. Id. at 585.
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to dismiss, arguing that the First Amendment protected its decision to
run the story.63
The Western District of North Carolina was clearly not amused. It
sided strongly with the high school student in an opinion highly critical
of Gawker’s choice to publish.64 In a sharp response to Gawker’s claim
that the article concerned a public controversy and therefore deserved
First Amendment protection, the court found that the article “tended
to pander more to the ‘lurid’ [and] ‘voyeuristic attention of the
people.’”65 Gawker had used a sensational and graphic headline—
“Flashing Vagina[s]”—to attract readers to its website.66 Moreover, and
of key importance to future First Amendment litigants, the court
suggested that the situation involved both a private party and a private
controversy and, therefore, deserved lessened protection.67 The court
also found that “the false accusation that [the plaintiff] actively lifted
her gown for the purpose of a photograph [was] sufficient to be
libelous per se.”68
Finally, the court held that the student’s negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim was valid, which is a troubling result for future
media litigants, given the emotional distress that any news story could
well cause to the individual at its focus.69 The court found that, under
North Carolina’s “Good Faith and Retraction” statute, once the student
notified Gawker of the article’s inaccuracies, Gawker had a duty to
publish a retraction and by not doing so, Gawker had breached its
duty.70 More importantly, the court ruled that the plaintiff’s severe

63. Id. at 582–83, 587; see also Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 4,
6, 7, 9, Araya, 966 F. Supp. 2d 582 (citing various cases arguing that the First
Amendment protects expression, even when that speech is insulting or outrageous).
64. Araya, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 592.
65. Id. (quoting Foretich v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1099,
1107 (D.D.C. 1991)).
66. See id (noting that “[t]he article lured readers to the website with a sensational
headline focused on ‘Flashing Vagina[s]’”).
67. Id. at 594 (“[T]his Court does not believe that the First Amendment protects
false statements in libel or infliction of emotional distress cases concerning private
plaintiffs and private controversies.”).
68. Id. at 598 (“A fair interpretation by the ordinary person would arrive at the
conclusion that such an individual was disrespectful of the decorum demanded by societal
norms, and perhaps was purposefully seeking attention for his or her own behavior.”).
69. Id. at 603.
70. Id. at 601–02.
Before any action, either civil or criminal, is brought for the publication, in a
newspaper or periodical, of a libel, the plaintiff or prosecutor shall at least five days
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emotional distress was foreseeable.71 “Because of the age of the
plaintiff,” the court reasoned, “the widespread nature of [Gawker’s] media
reach, the vulnerability of private individuals in the press, the embarrassing
nature of the facts as represented, and the notice of falsehood,” the
plaintiff had pleaded foreseeability with “sufficient factual heft.”72
Note in particular the court’s concern not for freedom of the press,
but for “the vulnerability of private individuals in the press”73 and how
that language contrasts with historic language lauding the press.74
The story of the mortified teenager shows how bad facts make bad
and lasting law in the current anti-media environment. News
judgments made by publishers like Gawker can harm all media when
courts respond by eroding the traditional judicial deference that had
long shielded journalistic news judgment. It is relevant here too that
the court considered the Gawker article a “piece of journalism”75
published by “the press”76 and, in that context, emphasized the
vulnerability of people like the plaintiff who had been harmed by
publishers. That language and the ultimate outcome, especially the
suggestion that the plaintiff had a valid negligent-infliction-ofemotional-distress claim, has at least the potential to shape the
outcome in lawsuits brought against media in the future.
B. The Acquitted and Gawker
As a second example of how Gawker has helped in some part to
shape the changing anti-media legal landscape, consider Huon v.
Denton,77 a lawsuit involving Gawker’s at-the-time spinoff website,
Jezebel.78 The outcome, a reverse-and-remand decision by the Seventh
Circuit, may not appear particularly troubling at first, especially

before instituting such action serve notice in writing on the defendant, specifying
the article and the statements therein which he alleges to be false and defamatory.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99-1(a) (2012).
71. Araya, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 602.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See, for example, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), in which the Court
wrote that constitutional “guarantees are not for the benefit of the press so much as
for the benefit of all of us” because “a broadly defined freedom of the press assures
the maintenance of our political system and an open society. ” Id. at 389.
75. Araya, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 585.
76. Id. at 602.
77. 841 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2016).
78. Id. at 736; JEZEBEL, https://jezebel.com (last visited Nov. 30, 2017).
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because the judge sided with Gawker on a number of fronts.79 At the
same time, however, the outcome suggests some pushback against
traditional protections for the press.80 In short, the court’s decision
reads almost as if it wanted to find Gawker liable for something.
The case involved a man who had sued an unaffiliated website for
suggesting that he was a rapist when he had, in fact, been acquitted of
the crime.81 The Gawker-related article was provocatively titled
“Acquitted Rapist Sues Blog for Calling Him Serial Rapist”82 and included
the man’s booking photograph.83 The plaintiff argued in part that the
headline partnered with the mugshot suggested that he was a rapist,
when in fact, he had been acquitted.84 The Seventh Circuit rejected
the plaintiff’s defamation claim.85 “[H]eadlines must be considered
alongside the accompanying article and not in isolation,” the court
wrote, finding that the article itself accurately described the
circumstances of the man’s acquittal.86
Gawker, however, did not fare as well when the court considered the
comments left by readers under the article.87 Normally, section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act (CDA) protects websites from tort
liability for comments left by others so that website publishers are not
tasked with cleaning up unaffiliated speech.88 Here, however, the
plaintiff argued that “Gawker’s comments forum was not a mere
passive conduit for disseminating defamatory statements” but that
“Gawker itself was an information content provider.”89 The court
agreed, in effect, that Gawker could be liable if it had done the
following things that the plaintiff alleged:

79. Huon, 841 F.3d at 736 (finding that the trial court judge correctly rejected the
defamation claim because the title of the article was innocent when read with the
whole article, and the article was an accurate report).
80. Id. at 742 (explaining that Gawker may be correct that none of Huon’s
allegations actually occurred, but that does not warrant dismissal).
81. Id. at 736.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 737 (explaining that the Jezebel article superimposed the defendant’s
2008 mugshot onto the Above the Law (ATL) article and explained both the criminal
trial for rape and the lawsuit against ATL).
84. Id. at 739.
85. Id. at 736.
86. Id. at 739.
87. Id. at 736–37. The website at issue was Jezebel, one of Gawker’s websites at the
time. The court repeats the Gawker name throughout, however.
88. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (f)(3) (2012).
89. Huon, 841 F.3d at 742.
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(1) “encouraged and invited” users to defame [the plaintiff],
through selecting and urging the most defamation-prone
commenters to “post more comments and continue to escalate the
dialogue”; (2) “edited,” “shaped,” and “choreographed” the content
of the comments that it received; (3) “selected” for publication every
comment that appeared beneath the Jezebel article; and
(4) employed individuals who authored at least some of the
comments themselves.90

Past courts had rejected related claims against websites because of
section 230 of the CDA.91 Here, however, the Seventh Circuit decided
that the plaintiff could attempt to prove these allegations—seemingly
including comment selection and comment encouragement for
profit—reversing the trial court judge who ruled that the plaintiff
failed to state a claim.92
Although the court did not discount the plaintiff successfully
proving all four points to support his claim, it highlighted the fourth—
that Gawker employed some of the anonymous commenters—
regardless of the fact that there was no apparent evidence to support
the allegation.93 Moreover, the court seemed to be particularly
interested in the economic reasons that may have been behind
Gawker’s decision to accept comments in the first place. The court
viewed critically the complaint’s allegation that Gawker “employees
might have anonymously authored comments, alleging that increasing
the defamatory nature of comments can increase traffic to Gawker’s
websites, which can in turn enhance the attractiveness of Gawker’s
commenting system for prospective advertisers.”94 Furthermore, the
court’s opinion critically explained how Gawker had planned to
“monetize” comments and why this might be attractive to advertisers.95
This sort of focus—on media’s business interests as relevant to its

90. Id.
91. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that section
230 of the CDA barred claims against a publisher who failed to remove or screen
defamatory messages); see also Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st
Cir. 2016) (finding that section 230 “allows website operators to engage in blocking
and screening of third-party content, free from liability for such good-faith efforts”).
92. Huon, 841 F.3d at 736, 742.
93. Id. at 742.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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potential liability—rejects longstanding precedent that suggests that
journalism’s profitability interests should be irrelevant.96
Gawker denied all of the plaintiff’s allegations97 and amici helped
argue that a pro-plaintiff response by the court would lead to a wave of
frivolous claims springing from unaffiliated others’ comments despite
CDA protections.98 The Seventh Circuit was not persuaded.99 “Indeed,”
the court wrote, “potentially meritorious claims could be prematurely
and improperly dismissed if we were to accept the Gawker Defendants’
position, since the information necessary to prove or refute allegations
like [the plaintiff’s] is typically available only to defendants.”100
This outcome is troubling for all news media. First, section 230 of
the CDA has been interpreted broadly to protect behavior such as
selecting certain comments for publication and for editing out certain
comments.101 Second, many websites benefit in some way from
comments; the additional clicks help prove an increasing readership
and an increasing readership helps raise advertising rates, even for
mainstream news sites.102 Finally, some mainstream news organizations
actively encourage reporters to engage commenters with comments of
their own after an article in order to answer questions and maintain
civility.103
The possibility that liability can spring from the
encouragement and shaping of comments, and potentially even from
the economic interests in comments, is troubling for websites of any

96. This is inherent in the CDA itself. See Hinton v. Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, 72 F.
Supp. 3d 685, 690 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (rejecting the plaintiff's assertion that defendant's
receipt of profits from advertising was improper under the CDA).
97. Id. (clarifying that Gawker may, in fact, be innocent, but the allegations are not
so implausible that a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted).
98. Id. at 742–43.
99. Id. at 743.
100. Id.
101.
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on
account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected . . . .
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(a) (2012).
102. See Adam Felder, How Comments Shape Perceptions of Sites’ Quality—and Affect
Traffic, ATLANTIC (June 5, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2014/06/internet-comments-and-perceptions-of-quality/371862 (suggesting
that the “bottom-line metric on the web” is traffic).
103. For an example, see nola.com, the website of the New Orleans Times-Picayune
newspaper.
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sort. It is all the more troubling considering that the Huon decision
came from a federal appellate court with the very real power to shape
outcomes in similar cases in the future.
C. Gawker and Hulk Hogan
In 2012, Gawker published a grainy and graphic sex tape featuring
professional wrestler Hulk Hogan.104 “[B]ecause the internet has
made it easier for all of us to be shameless voyeurs and deviants,” the
article that introduced the sex tape explained, “we love to watch famous
people having sex” even though it is “something we’re not supposed to
see.”105 Gawker titled its article, “Even for a Minute, Watching Hulk Hogan
Have Sex in a Canopy Bed is Not Safe for Work but Watch it Anyway.”106
In Fall 2012, a former student who remembered that this particular
press-privacy clash regarding a celebrity sex tape was one that I
predicted would occur someday alerted me to the article. As Gawker
urged in its headline, I watched the video at work and I took notes,
recognizing that a lawsuit may well be filed based upon the publication
and that the video could soon disappear in response.
In those notes, I wrote that the video “showed Hulk Hogan’s
buttocks and penis for approximately one minute and twenty seconds.”
That meant that anyone who clicked on the link could watch Hulk
Hogan fully nude and engaged in sexual behavior for over a minute;
Gawker’s attorneys have suggested that ten seconds of this nudity
involved graphic sex.107 An attorney for Hulk Hogan described the
tape as one that featured “oral sex” and “standard sexual intercourse,”
one that also went to great lengths to provide subtitles as Hogan spoke
to his sex partner.108 While it would not matter much to the law at
104. The original article is no longer available, but a screenshot can be found here:
Jonathan Mahler, Gawker’s Moment of Truth, N.Y. TIMES, (June 12, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/business/media/gawker-nick-dentonmoment-of-truth.html.
105. Id.; Eriq Gardner, Gawker Trial: Editor Admits Hulk Hogan’s Penis Isn’t
REP.
(Mar.
14,
2016,
9:42
AM),
Newsworthy,
HOLLYWOOD
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/gawker-trial-editor-admits-hulk-875098.
106. Gardner, supra note 104.
107. Poucher Lecture 2017, FLA. L. REV. (Nov. 9, 2017), https://mediasite.video.ufl.edu/
Mediasite/Play/c297f67eec0343c7b3292b7d9702bba81d (statement made by Gregg
Thomas, Gawker’s local counsel).
108. Julia Marsh & Yaron Steinbuch, Where Gawker Editor Draws the Line: A Sex Tape
of a 4-Year-Old, N.Y. POST (Mar. 9, 2016, 11:29 AM), http://nypost.com/2016/
03/09/gawker-editors-line-a-sex-tape-of-a-4-year-old (“I saw a video depicting my client
having sex, oral sex, standard sexual intercourse, [that] took great pains to display his
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issue, it is also worth noting that it appeared that Hulk Hogan had no
idea he was being taped;109 his casual spoken and body language
suggested as much. Moreover, the video camera seemed affixed to
someplace high, perhaps the bedroom ceiling, creating a view from
above as might a security-type camera. The camera did not seem
placed in a way that would have given a more provocative view of
captured behaviors.
Ultimately, Gawker did not defend its decision to publish the sex
tape well. A.J. Daulerio, the author of Gawker’s Hulk Hogan sex tape
story, suggested at trial that he was “amused” by the tape because it
“was not a situation [Daulerio] ever expected to watch [Hulk Hogan]
in.”110 The Hollywood Reporter’s coverage of the trial highlighted in part
Daulerio’s admission that the graphic nudity featured in the Hulk
Hogan sex tape had little or no news value:
After Daulerio acknowledged that he had told other Gawker staffers
that Hogan’s penis should be shown in the video, [Hogan’s
attorney] zeroed in on the topic.
“Mr. Bollea’s penis had no news value, right?” asked [Hogan’s
attorney].
“No,” responded Daulerio.
“It wasn’t newsworthy, right?”
“No.”
“There was no news value to showing them having sex?”
“No, not necessarily.”111

The Hollywood Reporter also focused on Daulerio’s testimony about
his publishing motivations and his lack of concern about how others
might view the tape:
“You could have commented [on what appeared in the tape] without
showing the tape?” [Hulk Hogan’s attorney] asked.
“I could have,” said Daulerio.
“You believed publishing the sex tape would bring traffic to the site, right?”

penis and even went so far as to demonstrate what everyone was saying to each
other . . . by virtue of incorporating subtitles.”).
109. I spent a number of years working in television before I became a lawyer and,
therefore, usually have some ability to judge whether individuals are aware of a
camera’s presence or not. As I recall from the tape, Hogan moves about the room and
talks informally in a way that suggests he does not know he is being filmed.
110. Gardner, supra note 104.
111. Id.
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“Again, the whole point of publishing is to bring traffic. This is the
way I chose to present the story.”
“You didn’t care whether it emotionally distressed him, right?”
“That’s not my job.”
“It didn’t matter that it was a morbid and sensation-prying, did it?”
“No it didn’t.”112

Earlier, Daulerio had testified in a deposition contradictorily that
most sex videos had news value, even including those involving
children.113 When Hulk Hogan’s attorney asked Daulerio where he
might draw the line, Daulerio suggested that coverage of sex tapes
involving children aged four and under would be inappropriate.114
By its own admission, then, Gawker had made a decision to publish
the Hulk Hogan sex tape without regard to news value, but for public
amusement and for clicks. Gawker’s statements regarding the lack of
news value in the sex tape had sealed its fate, even arguably on appeal.
Recall the Restatement’s focus on newsworthiness and its suggestion
that morbid and sensational prying for its own sake would not be
tolerated.115
The jury awarded Hulk Hogan $140 million dollars in damages.116
The case settled in late 2016 for $31 million.117
II. THE PERFECT STORM: GAWKER AND A FED-UP JUDICIARY
In 1995, Judge Abner Mikva of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit warned in a law review article that a change was coming in the

112. Id.
113. Marsh & Steinbuch, supra note 108.
114. Id. Later, Gawker suggested that Daulerio was being flippant. See Gardner,
supra note 104 (explaining how Daulerio testified at trial that Hogan’s attorneys knew
he was being sarcastic during the deposition, but acknowledging that child
pornography is not a topic to joke about).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
116. Laura Wagner, Jury Awards Hulk Hogan Additional $25 Million in Sex Tape
Lawsuit Against Gawker, NPR (Mar. 18, 2016, 9:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2016/03/18/471037070/jury-awards-hulk-hogan-115-million-in-sex-tapelawsuit-against-gawker.
117. Sydney Ember, Gawker and Hulk Hogan Reach $31 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/business/media/gawkerhulk-hogan-settlement.html.
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law that would negatively affect all media.118 “Watch out!” he wrote,
“[t]here’s a backlash coming in First Amendment doctrine.”119
Judge Mikva explained that there was a feeling among some judges
that current legal precedent from the time of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan120 protected the media’s “inaccurate and harmful reporting”
too strongly and that “the state of journalism,” including a decline in
standards in reporting, had led to the coming backlash.121 At the dawn
of the internet, then, long before Gawker and similar websites had
entered the publishing picture, a highly influential judge on perhaps
the nation’s most influential federal appellate court, warned that
judges were fed up and that irresponsible journalism was on its way
toward lessening press freedoms. As prescient as Judge Mikva was, it is
not clear that he foresaw how quickly the brazen conduct of upstart
publishers would fulfill his prophesy.
Gawker is not alone in facing such backlash; the threat to privacy
posed by internet rogues has also eroded trust of mainstream media.
Just a few months after the jury decision in the Hulk Hogan case, a
federal judge in Florida found that ESPN may well have invaded an
NFL player’s privacy when it included the player’s medical chart in a
tweet about his finger needing amputation.122 The judge recognized
that the information about the public figure’s finger amputation was
newsworthy but held that the addition of the medical chart could well
have gone too far.123 The case immediately settled.124 Compare that
outcome with the one involving the rape tape in Anderson, in which the
court decided that the video of a private plaintiff helped prove that the
rape had indeed been taped.125

118. See Abner J. Mikva, In My Opinion, Those Are Not Facts, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 291,
296 (1995).
119. Id.
120. 376 U.S. 254, 279–83 (1964).
121. Mikva, supra note 118, at 296–97.
122. See Pierre-Paul v. ESPN Inc., No. 16-21156-Civ-COOKE/TORRES, 2016 WL
4530884, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2016). Jason Pierre-Paul had sued for the same
privacy tort as Hulk Hogan. Id.
123. Id.
124. Marissa Payne, Jason Pierre-Paul and ESPN Reach Settlement in Invasion-of-Privacy
Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/earlylead/wp/2017/02/03/jason-pierre-paul-and-espn-reach-settlement-in-invasion-ofprivacy-lawsuit (speculating that ESPN may have settled because there was no clear
precedent).
125. Supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text.
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What may be most important here, however, is what is suggested by
Judge Mikva’s warning in 1995: the shift toward privacy and against
the press is one that is perfectly allowable under current law because
such assessment is the subject of judicial discretion. Ultimately, a
judge’s hands are not tied in favor of protection for the press because
the test is a more subjective one.126 Consider the Second Restatement
of Torts section mentioned earlier titled, “Publicity Given to Private
Life.”127 There, the Restatement authors suggest that media liability is
appropriate should media publish particularly invasive private facts
about an individual without a good news-based reason128: “One who
gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another” is
liable for a privacy invasion if “the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and (b) is not of
legitimate concern to the public.”129 The Restatement later suggests
that news is a broad term, but that its appropriate meaning does have
boundaries:
The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of
information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid
and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which
a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say
that he had no concern. The limitations, in other words, are those
of common decency, having due regard to the freedom of the press
and its reasonable leeway to choose what it will tell the public, but
also due regard to the feelings of the individual and the harm that
will be done to him by the exposure.130

This balancing language between press and privacy and its
recognition that at some point the right to privacy trumps the freedom
of the press to report truthful information parallels the relevant Supreme
Court jurisprudence. Although cases such as Florida Star v. B.J.F131 and
Bartnicki v. Vopper132 ultimately sided with media in its reporting of
truthful information, the Court’s holdings are far from broad.133

126. See Mikva, supra note 118, at 296.
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. § 652D cmt. a.
131. 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989) (a rape victim’s identity).
132. 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001) (a surreptitiously-recorded cell phone conversation).
133. For an in-depth discussion of related Supreme Court jurisprudence, see Amy
Gajda, Privacy, Press, and the Right to Be Forgotten in the United States, 93 WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018).
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In Florida Star, the Court wrote that no automatic constitutional
protection exists for truthful publication, explaining that there is a
“zone of personal privacy” to which every person is entitled and one
that the State can indeed protect.134 The Court even conceded that
circumstances may occur in which the government can punish the
publication of a rape victim’s name.135 In Florida Star, the problem in part
was that the State itself had revealed the information to the journalists;
liability against the journalists, therefore, would be untenable.
In Bartnicki, the Court wrote that a publication could well be
punished for reporting “domestic gossip or other information of
purely private concern” that was sufficiently intrusive such that it
invaded an individual’s privacy interests.136 There, the taped phone
conversation that was aired by a radio station was newsworthy in that it
involved a threat of violence in a contentious union negotiation.137
“The months of negotiations over the proper level of compensation
for teachers at the Wyoming Valley West High School were
unquestionably a matter of public concern,” the Court wrote, “and
respondents were clearly engaged in debate about that concern.”138
Moreover, as I have observed previously,139 the two Justices who
concurred in the Bartnicki case used the publication of a sex tape
featuring a celebrity as an example of a without-question privacy
invasion.140 The Justices labeled such a scenario a “truly private
matter”141 long before Gawker published what it did. Those two
concurring Justices added to the three who dissented in the underlying
case seemingly make Bartnicki at least a 5-4 outcome in favor of Hulk
Hogan and the privacy in his sex tape over Gawker’s news decision.
This means that had Hulk Hogan brought his claim to the Court, it
would likely have decided in his favor.
This review of the law of the press-privacy clash suggests that it is
possible—and arguably likely—that Hulk Hogan would have won his

134. 491 U.S. at 541.
135. Id.
136. 532 U.S. at 533.
137. Id. at 518, 525.
138. Id. at 535.
139. See Amy Gajda, Privacy vs. Press, SLATE (Mar. 21, 2016, 5:55 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/03/what_mi
ght_happen_if_the_hogan_gawker_case_reaches_the_supreme_court.html.
140. 532 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining that a sex tape is not of
legitimate public concern).
141. Id.
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case against Gawker even without Peter Theil’s financial intervention
had the case somehow proceeded as a typical contingent fee case.142
Longstanding privacy law that protects plaintiffs against overzealous
publishers, including those who would publish explicit sexual
information, supported, at least in part, a plaintiff’s victory.
And, key here, without such a law that balances a right to certain
privacies with a right to publish truthful information, privacy would fail
to protect even a woman who had suffered great harm because
someone who was amused or held a grudge published her most
intimate sexual or medical secrets on the internet.
This is why Peter Thiel deserves our sympathy as well.
III. THE POTENTIAL TAKEAWAY
One way to combat this shift toward privacy and against press
freedom is to presume all truthful information newsworthy.143 Only
when plaintiffs could show publication of information that has strongly
been protected on privacy grounds in the United States—graphic
sexual information, deeply private medical information, and the like—
would a judge who is not convinced of the information’s news value
give the question to a jury.144 This would mean that some sex tapes
would be found newsworthy,145 as would some medical charts146 and

142. See Levi, supra note 2, at 774–76 (explaining that Thiel, a co-founder of PayPal,
funded Hulk Hogan’s litigation possibly in amounts upwards of $10 million).
Admittedly, it is not clear that an attorney would have taken the matter on contingent
fee, given that the press had typically won lawsuits that hinged on newsworthiness and
given the amount of work that would have been required to move the case forward.
Nonetheless, the law was there that could well have supported such an enterprising
attorney.
143. See GAJDA, supra note 11, at 233.
144. Id.
145. I have used for years in my privacy classes the example of a president having
sexual relations with spies, theorizing that a court would find the publication of such
a tape sufficiently newsworthy, given that people would want visual proof that the
activity had in fact occurred. Even there, however, I suggested that a litigationconcerned publisher would do well to block graphic nudity or graphic sex acts.
146. Here, as one example, the medical chart of an elected official that showed
dementia would likely withstand a privacy-based claim. Medical information, as the
Restatement notes, is often protected as deeply personal; this is reflected in various
statutes as well, including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA). The court in the Pierre-Paul case noted that link. Even so, a politician’s
health is decidedly newsworthy in that he votes on matters affecting the public, so it is
difficult to imagine any such medical chart as being protected by a court on privacy
grounds.
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other similar private information, but some would not be. Most
importantly, the vast majority of truthful information would be
protected as a matter of law.
Given the uncertainty for media today as courts shift more often to
embrace privacy and as they refuse to give media outlets the deference
that they once enjoyed, and as litigation financing firms recognize the
vulnerability of the press in privacy cases, however, perhaps the
ultimate solution to the problem is to cap invasion-of-privacy awards.
This was an idea mentioned at a Law and Society panel during its
annual meeting in 2016.147 There, experts on privacy from around the
world shared their countries’ legal conceptions of newsworthiness and
case outcomes. Some of these examples included limitations on
recovery in invasion-of-privacy actions.
A recent high-profile example involved Kate Middleton, the Duchess
of Cambridge, who won the 2017 lawsuit she filed against Closer
magazine. In 2012, Closer had published topless photographs of the
Duchess that also included her husband, Prince William, taken with a
long-range lens.148 The French court awarded the couple €100,000,
the equivalent of approximately $120,000,149 the maximum amount
allowed by law.
Compared to U.S. standards, especially in egregious cases, such an
amount seems paltry. At the same time, a similar cap would be an
effective deterrent for many privacy-based lawsuits against media.
Gawker, for example, would very likely still be publishing had a cap
limited Hulk Hogan’s damages. Plaintiffs’ attorneys would more
seriously question the strength of any privacy-based claim before filing,
and litigation financing firms and wealthy individuals would not have
strong interest in such cases. Finally, concerns about courts meddling
in journalistic decisions would be resolved to some extent.
At the same time, the individual privacy plaintiff harmed by an
ethics-rejecting publisher would be able to recover something from the
entity that caused her emotional turmoil.

147. Printed Program, L. & Soc’y Ass’n, 31, http://www.lawandsociety.org/
NewOrleans2016/docs/2016_Program.pdf.
148. See Sandrine Amiel & Lauren Said-Moorhouse, Duchess of Cambridge Topless
Photos Were Privacy Invasion, CNN (Sept. 5, 2017, 5:13 PM) (reporting that a French court
found the photos were an invasion of privacy, awarded money to the Duke and Duchess, and
fined the editor of Closer magazine and its owner with the maximum fine allowed by law).
149. Id.
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CONCLUSION
This Response has focused on publishers gone awry and on the law that
at times favors privacy over those publishers’ decisions to publish truth.
In doing so, it suggests that we might appropriately have sympathy
for two devils. One is Gawker, a publisher that pushed the envelope of
propriety so firmly in its quest to publish the truth that others would
not that it was ripped off the internet by Peter Theil, a motivated
litigation financer who stayed in the shadows until the damage was
done. But Thiel is the second sympathetic devil in this scenario. We
may not have guessed his name, and what to do about his game of
behind-the-scenes litigation financing is a puzzlement. Nevertheless,
his privacy-interested argument is one that has been embraced in the
United States in a legal sense for decades, including by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Given that conflict—a desire to protect media from those with deep
pockets while at the same time protecting at least some individual
privacy interests—the best possible outcome may be to cap damage
awards. Such a solution could well strike the right balance by
protecting both press and privacy.

